



THE ALBERTA TEACHERS' ASSOCIATION


SUPPLEMENTARY BRIEF

to

**ALBERTA ROYAL COMMISSION
ON EDUCATION**

SEPTEMBER, 1958

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SUPPLEMENTARY BRIEF

MERIT RATING AND TENURE

presented to

**ALBERTA ROYAL COMMISSION
ON EDUCATION**

by

THE ALBERTA TEACHERS' ASSOCIATION

EDMONTON, ALBERTA

SEPTEMBER, 1958



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FOREWORD

In May of 1958, The Alberta Teachers' Association presented a brief to the Alberta Royal Commission on Education, dealing with a large number of matters in the wide terms of reference given the Commission. During the discussions with the Association's representatives, the members of the Commission expressed keen interest in two subjects which The Alberta Teachers' Association brief had touched upon, namely, merit pay and tenure. The chairman of the Commission requested that The Alberta Teachers' Association present a supplementary brief on these two matters to the autumn sessions of the Commission, and the Association expressed willingness to do the necessary investigation.

This supplementary brief is the result of the Association's study of these two very important aspects of teacher recruitment and retention. Two delegates were sent to the Workshop in Merit Salary Schedules held at Syracuse University, Syracuse, New York, July 7 - 11, 1958, in order that the most up-to-date information on merit pay scales and their impact upon the teaching profession could be made available to the Commission. The materials on tenure are garnered from our long experience in this field in the Province of Alberta.

CHAPTER 1

DEFINITION OF TERMS

Merit is a quality or attribute which is a basis for the award of a reward or a punishment. It is a quality or attribute which is a basis for the award of a reward or a punishment. It is a quality or attribute which is a basis for the award of a reward or a punishment.

MERIT RATING

Merit rating is a process of evaluating the performance of an individual in relation to a specific job or task. It is a process of evaluating the performance of an individual in relation to a specific job or task. It is a process of evaluating the performance of an individual in relation to a specific job or task.

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PART I

SOME IMPLICATIONS OF MERIT PAY

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CHAPTER 1

DEFINITION OF TERMS

Much of the difficulty that arises in a discussion of merit rating and merit pay scales designed to recognize meritorious service is the result of a confusion of terms. Below are expanded definitions of terms used in this supplementary brief.

MERIT RATING

In this brief, this term is used to mean a systematic method of evaluating employee performance. This evaluation procedure may have several purposes:

- (a) to provide an analysis of strong and weak points so that employees' performance may be improved through a guidance program,
- (b) to provide the personnel division with a yardstick to measure the effectiveness of testing, recruiting, and in-service training programs,
- (c) to help determine promotions, transfers, demotions, dismissals, and salaries¹.

Merit rating has been used for many years in business and industry, as well as in education administration in the United States. A 1957 study by the New York State Teachers Association, *Teacher Merit and Teacher Salary*, shows that both in industry and in education, evaluation for salary purposes has shown a steady decline while its use for the other purposes has been increasing.

MERIT PAY

Merit pay scales are set up in an attempt to reward with money those who rank as "superior", or "class one" or "meritorious" on some kind of merit rating scale. Scales are generally of three types:

- (a) those which reward "superior service",
- (b) those which penalize unsatisfactory service,
- (c) those which combine the reward and penalty provisions.

Merit pay scales stress the money incentive in group output, and often run counter to the non-financial incentives, such as feelings of belonging, cooperation, and loyalty to the group's output objectives.

¹Adapted from the definition of the New Jersey Education Association from articles in *Rating Employee and Supervisory Performance* (American Management Association).

SUPER MAXIMUMS

The Association uses this term in this brief to mean payments made over and above a professional rate of pay.

THE MERIT PRINCIPLE

The merit principle in personnel administration involves the concept of selecting employees on the basis of ability to do a given job, and advancing them during satisfactory performance of duty. It is in sharp contrast to the type of hiring and firing done on the basis of economic necessity, personal likes and dislikes, or political pressures. This merit principle is applied in the hiring of civil servants, who must pass an examination to demonstrate their ability before appointment is made. In the wider sense, it is inherent in the granting of professional qualifications by educational institutions which are given the authority to judge the merit of the individual before giving him the right to practise his profession in society. Whatever the application, the merit principle system demands that a careful screening take place **before** hiring; it requires that competent supervision be available during the term of service, it requires that vigorous measures be applied to weed out the incompetent, and it requires constant in-service education.

A study of the policies of The Alberta Teachers' Association in teacher recruitment and retention will quickly reveal that the Association has long been a proponent of the above principle. Difficulties confronting the Association in attempting to apply this principle in Alberta have been numerous. A sharp about-face in present teacher recruitment policies would have to be effected, including higher entrance requirements for the Faculty of Education, and more teacher education before certification. The implementation of the merit principle, as we have defined it, would impose even more drastic revisions of present retention policies, including both pay scales and pensions. As stated in the Association's main brief (page 50), teachers' pensions do not compare favourably with those of workers in industry, business, or government. The Association has been fighting a long, uphill battle to have the general pay scales increased in the face of resistance from some boards which feel such increases are not justified for all teachers. It is the opinion of the Association that no expedients can substitute for the principles of careful selection, high standards, and in-service education in the teaching profession, yet Alberta has tried many. Qualifications for entry into the teaching profession have been lowered, while at the same time the general public has expressed indignation about the quality of the teachers, and teaching services. Our administrators and supervisors have never been provided with the time and services they need in order that they may carry on the continuous in-service education of the competent teacher, and provide the supervision to improve the inexperienced and incompetent staff member. Salary scales have not been established that will provide a supply of teachers so that necessary degree of selection can take

place. Any attempt to introduce merit pay scales on the basis of our present system is more than slightly ridiculous. They would simply penalize the group which was hired under conditions which did not involve the application of the merit principle, and would function so as to keep the merit principle from operating in the future. Our problem in Alberta in implementing the merit principle is to raise the general salary to a level competitive with other occupations to procure the talented persons we need, and to redouble our efforts to improve the service of those who were employed under less stringent entrance requirements.

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We should like to point out that the problem of introducing merit pay scales on the basis of our present system is more than slightly ridiculous. They would simply penalize the group which was hired under conditions which did not involve the application of the merit principle, and would function so as to keep the merit principle from operating in the future. Our problem in Alberta in implementing the merit principle is to raise the general salary to a level competitive with other occupations to procure the talented persons we need, and to redouble our efforts to improve the service of those who were employed under less stringent entrance requirements.

Table 1: Merit and Teacher Salary, 1957, New York State Teachers Association

CHAPTER 2

MERIT PAY IN BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY

We have included in our supplementary memoranda the work done by the New York State Teachers Association in this field. In addition, we would like to make some comments of a general nature on the subject.

In the first place, investigation has shown conclusively that the practice of determining salaries or wages on the basis of evaluated quality of service is not the general procedure in business and industry. The trend in industry is away from using merit rating for salary purposes and toward using it for developmental purposes, that is, to develop the potential of the employee.

We should keep in mind that the end product of the industrial or business worker is much easier to evaluate than the end product of the teacher's work, but nonetheless the problems encountered by business and industry and public education in attempting to relate compensation to competence have been strikingly similar. All have run into the common problem centred around the fact that their output is a group effort, and the problems involved in promoting efficient group effort are vastly dissimilar to those of promoting successful individual effort. When one deals with a group, the psychological motivators heavily overshadow the economic motivators. Industrial management experts have recognized for many years that the incentive of money, by itself, to the **total group** output, has been very limited. "Studies have shown that money is an incentive powerful enough to offset group pressures and engender a competitive effort within the group only in the case of highly individualistic and highly acquisitive persons (who comprise but a small proportion of the population)."¹ No substitute has been found in business and industry for competent administration and sound personnel policies in maintaining the quality of group endeavour. Industry has found that the key factor in getting a group to perform to its maximum is enlightened leadership and good esprit de corps. Adequate compensation will then play its part in attracting and keeping desirable personnel. We believe that the excerpt from the New York State Teachers Association study included in the supplementary memoranda obviates the necessity of further comment in this area.

¹*Teacher Merit and Teacher Salary*, 1957, New York State Teachers Association.

CHAPTER 3

THE SYRACUSE CONFERENCE

The keen interest of The Alberta Teachers' Association in the subject of merit rating resulted in the sending of two delegates to the Workshop in Merit Salary Schedules at Syracuse University, July 7 - 11, 1958. The delegates returned with the benefit of a week's contact with a large number of United States educators, all of whom are involved with some aspect of merit rating.

The workshop was composed of 93 people who came to the conference to try to find the answer to the question, "Can merit rating be a success?" Included in the group were 42 teachers, nine school board members, ten superintendents of schools, 14 principals of schools, a dean of a faculty of education, a junior college director, state research directors from Utah, New York, and Washington, management consultants, a magazine editor, chairmen of various lay groups interested in education, and others. Ontario, Quebec (Protestant), Saskatchewan, and Alberta were represented, as were all sections of the United States except the southeast.

Among the workshop groups set up were those investigating the problems of evaluating teachers and teaching, the use of merit rating in industry, the criteria for evaluating good salary programs, and merit salary scales now in operation. Each group had the services of four consultants, all of whom are closely connected with the problems of merit rating. Each group summarized its week's work for the final session of the workshop. We believe that some of the observations will be of interest to the Commission.

The group investigating merit scales in industry decided to approach the personnel managers of two large industries located in Syracuse to find out if the mass of research material which is available on this subject would be substantiated by local industrial experience. The group interviewed officers of the Brown-Lipe-Chapin Division of General Motors, and of the Carrier Corporation. The group found that there was little direct relationship between the merit rating given the employee, and his salary increases. The merit rating procedures were carried out primarily to attempt to increase the efficiency of the plants. In reply to the question, "Is this an efficient procedure in the judgment of the personnel officer?", the Carrier official stated, "Despite its many weaknesses, the plan is considered better than nothing. It gets less effective as the years go by." The General Motors official, in answer to the same question, stated that the procedure was good but that lack of trained supervisors resulted in less effective use of merit rating.

The group working on the criteria for good salary scales could not come to agreement on the question, "Should the salary program recognize varying degrees of the quality of performance?", although agreement was reached in the group on 20 other criteria of a good salary scale.

The findings of the group investigating evaluation scales now in existence centred on four evaluation scales now in operation, and two which are in the formative state. The group made the following observations:

- (a) the mutual faith of the people involved in a merit rating program is the key to the success of such a program;
- (b) merit rating is not a cure-all for a district's problems, and a school board should not go into it hoping that it will pull the district out of trouble,
- (c) where merit programs are in use, it is desirable for merit increments to be available early in the salary schedule.

This same group listed the handicaps to a merit salary program:

- (1) It tends to develop poor relationships between the administration and the teachers.
- (2) Inadequate administrative staff can be a serious detriment to the scheme.
- (3) There is often an arbitrary limit to the number of teachers who can receive merit pay.
- (4) Boards of education may adopt merit salary schedules expecting to save money, which will not happen if the true principle is applied.
- (5) Such a program requires a very highly trained and selected administrative staff which is not always available.

This group concluded its report with the statement, "Safe and constructive first steps toward evaluation for salary may be the formalization of evaluation procedures for the improvement of instruction."

The group investigating salary schedules now using merit pay made a searching investigation of six such schedules. Teachers, supervisory staff, or board members from the six districts under investigation were present in the group. If merit rating pay scales are to be applied, it was agreed that the following should be observed:

- (a) each district must form its own criteria and measuring instruments—it must not simply copy from another;
- (b) such a schedule must never be imposed on the teachers;
- (c) the administrative staff that does the evaluation should itself be evaluated by established criteria and measuring instruments;
- (d) salary increments for merit should be available to all teachers regardless of their years of service.

CHAPTER 4

THE UTAH STUDY

Mr. Gale Rose, secretary and research director, Utah School Merit Study Committee, acted as consultant at the Syracuse workshop and reported fully on the history and accomplishments of the committee he heads. The Alberta Teachers' Association feels that this study merits very careful consideration for it has covered much ground in the field of merit pay.

The Utah study had its beginnings in 1948, when the state legislature was dealing with a series of education problems, among which was the question of teachers' salaries. The state legislature decided to set up a special committee to look into merit pay for teachers. Four educationists, four lay citizens, and a government appointee as chairman were selected. Their problem was to answer the question, "Can individual merit in teaching be discovered and rewarded?" To date, the committee has spent nearly \$250,000 in research and investigation. It has yet to file a final report with the state legislature, though it has presented one interim report. The progress made was reported to the Syracuse workshop by Mr. Rose.

Mr. Rose outlined some of the problems the committee had encountered in the study. The basic problem was threefold: to define the scope of the teaching job objectively, to place a proper value on these items once they were defined, and to decide how to reward for these items. It is interesting to note that the committee employed job analysts to assist them, and that they reported that evaluating the teaching position was one of the most complex and difficult assignments they had ever attempted.

Some of the problems for which the Utah committee are still seeking the answers are:

Can you really determine teacher effectiveness?

Is bias a real danger in evaluation measurement?

Does merit pay encourage "apple polishing"?

Does merit pay lower morale?

Does merit pay destroy cooperation in teacher ranks?

Does merit pay create a reluctance in teachers to discuss problems with their supervisors?

Is there a concealed purpose behind school board pressure for merit pay?

Is it simply a device to save money by holding down salary levels?

In his final statement to the workshop, Mr. Rose said:

The teacher's job is a complex, on-going, emerging process, and it is naïve in the extreme to think that a simple rating program,

cheaply administered, can produce a valid or reliable picture of it. Teachers do and should resist attempts to alter their salaries on the basis of flimsy evidence such programs produce. . . . On the other hand, it is the duty and responsibility of a profession . . . to evaluate its work and its results with the greatest care and precision it can attain. . . . To say, however, that the merit principle is right and just is not to say that it is easy to attain or apply accurately, fairly, and with beneficial results. . . . Recognize that there are two major aspects to the problem: (a) the need for a personnel administration program which recognizes that the evaluation of teaching and the identification of meritorious performance should be just one part of the larger, well-developed personnel leadership program, the primary purpose of which is to help teachers succeed and improve in their work, (b) the need for a salary administration program which places merit into balanced perspective along with other legitimate factors which should help determine salary.

Mr. Rose went on to say that the personnel administration program he referred to would require skilled and trained administrators, and that perhaps the best place to start would be with a selection and training program to make sure that administrators have these skills. He pointed to the need for the understanding and cooperation of the teachers and other professional staff. He stated that boards would have to provide professional and clerical assistance so that administrators may devote the proper amount of time and effort to a continuous program of evaluation. He stressed the need for carefully developed criteria and evaluation procedures to give an objective evaluation, and emphasized the complexity of establishing such procedures. Speaking of salary administration problems, he warned of the danger of confusing merit salary factors and other possible salary factors, and pointed to the danger of failing to distinguish between a program to reward meritorious service and one to eliminate and penalize unacceptable performance. In concluding, Mr. Rose pointed out the need for establishing adequate professional salaries before trying to introduce merit pay. "Recognize that merit may be rewarded in other ways than by money alone," he concluded, "and that the incentives and motivations for which people work are not all the same." Mr. Rose expressed the opinion that the teaching job can be defined objectively. After ten years of study at a cost of \$250,000, the Utah committee has not arrived at a definition which it can accept itself.

CHAPTER 5

CANADIAN EXPERIMENTS IN MERIT PAY

CRANBROOK

The Cranbrook, British Columbia experiment in merit pay can be summed up simply by stating that it is a type of scale designed to penalize unsatisfactory performance and not to recognize superior service. The 1958 salary agreement, section 6, states:

Salary increments shall be automatic and payable as at September 1st unless inefficient work and unsatisfactory professional growth are evidenced by the report of the Inspector of Schools or by written report of the Principal, or both.

The agreement provides for withdrawal under the same conditions of one increment from any teacher at the maximum salary. A teacher may be paid above the proper placement on the schedule by special resolution of the board. A minimum of four inspections per year by the principal, plus inspector and department head inspections, are required by the agreement. The results of these inspections are considered by a committee of board members, the principal, and the inspector, and the names of those to be considered for salary increases are then forwarded to the school board. The board will not consider any teacher for increase in salary who has not been processed by this committee. In other words, the granting of normal increments is subject to review and normal increments may be withheld.

The instrument used for the measurement of the teachers is included as an addendum in the salary agreement. Based on 200 points, it includes a scale which allows 20 points for carrying a "fair" share of co-curricular activities. It warns that the co-curricular load is dependent upon factors such as teaching load, and requires that the raters take into account "initiative shown and intellectual stimulus provided" in such things as "year book, library club, school paper, teams, band, dances, clubs, *etcetera*", (*italics added*). Thirty points are allowed for "attention to matters which keep the school functioning smoothly". Among these are listed classroom supervision, including supervision of "halls, assemblies, lunchroom, detention hall, examinations, vicinity of school, *etcetera*", (*italics added*). Also in this section are included "complete conformity to application of school regulations" . . . and "promptness and care in turning in sundry reports, mark sheets, textbook issue, *etcetera*", (*italics added*), and "punctuality and consideration of other teachers, administration, office staff, custodians, *etcetera*", (*italics added*). Thirty points are allowed for teacher-pupil relationships, which include dignity, knowledge of subject matter, ability to analyze and solve disciplinary problems, posture in the classroom, use of proper English, avoidance of slang, sarcasm, and abusive terms. The other 120 points of the 200 possible are to be awarded by the principal and inspector on their evaluation of the teacher's ability and efficiency. The

points awarded are divided by two, and any teacher falling under the 80 percent mark is not eligible for any payment above basic scale. Provision is made for a board of appeal which consists of the same people who made the decision to withhold increments in the first place, plus a committee of the teachers. In conclusion, the agreement states that the whole thing is an experiment and that its success will depend upon the "complete co-operation of all concerned".

In the light of the research done on merit rating, it is difficult to conceive of a more gauche instrument than the Cranbrook formula, which is designed to measure one of the most intricate and complex of human occupations. It might be more logical to call the system a demerit system, in view of the fact that the penalties are automatically considered each year, while the rewards require special legislation by the school board. The system violates nearly all the concepts which were stressed as basic in the Utah study. A merit system must be set up with a clear concept of the difference between penalizing and rewarding. The Cranbrook formula fails also to recognize the difference between merit salary factors and other salary factors by assuming that supervision of many kinds of extra-curricular activities is not a special salary factor. The subjectivity of the formula is evident in the fact that 120 out of 200 marks are awarded by the principal and inspector on what they consider the teacher's efficiency and ability. Any objectivity that the formula does attempt to achieve is drained off by the seemingly innocuous "etceteras" italicized above. A quick glance at other basic salary scales in British Columbia districts will reveal that the Cranbrook basic pay scale is far from being near the top. Dr. Arvid J. Burke, research director for the New York State Teachers Association, stated at the Syracuse conference that those districts in New York which have been the most backward in the providing of administration services and high salary scales have been the loudest in their praise of merit pay.

With regard to the inauguration of the merit pay scales in any district, answers to the following questions would have to be sought before the wisdom of the inauguration could be verified.

Has it adopted high standards or qualifications for the employment of all professional staff members?

Have adequate basic pay scales been established and enlightened leadership provided which will recruit and retain personnel to meet these standards?

Have all teachers, administrators and department heads been selected solely upon the basis of these qualifications (merit)?

Have valid evaluation procedures been established which will apply to the accepted criteria?

Has there been an intensive supervision program outlined for those not hired on the merit principle?

Has there been an objective evaluation which will identify any personnel not performing up to potential and provision of assistance and guidance, transfer, or dismissal where necessary?

If any of these questions cannot be answered in the affirmative, there might be serious doubt as to the wisdom of trying to implement a merit pay system.

OTHERS

An examination of 1957-58 Alberta collective agreements indicates that the beginnings of two types of conditional pay scales are appearing in teachers' contracts. Some boards have restrictive clauses by which natural increments can be withheld. For example, the Athabasca School Division No. 42 retains the right to withhold the annual increments if teachers receive unsatisfactory reports from a superintendent during both of two consecutive years. The board of the Grande Prairie School District No. 2357 has delegated to the superintendent of schools the right to review the work of new appointees for the first two years. Natural increments may be withheld. The Brooks School District No. 2092 has the same discretionary power.

Other boards have so-called bonus clauses in their agreements. The Medicine Hat School District No. 76 reserves the right to set the salary for any teacher engaged by the board at any point on the schedule provided that the salary shall not be below the amount to which the teacher is entitled under the regular schedule. Wainwright School Division No. 32 may pay bonuses upon the recommendation of the superintendent. Two Hills School Division No. 21 reserves the right to give special allowances for qualifications or services until these can be named in the collective agreement.

The County of Newell No. 4 had a merit scheme in operation at one time. The present agreement simply gives the board the right to suspend annual increments in case of a teacher whose work or qualifications are inferior, until such time as the teacher attends summer school or takes other steps to improve his qualifications or service. Generally speaking, however, teachers have been unwilling to write restrictive or bonus clauses into the collective agreements.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Alberta Teachers' Association believes that from the practical point of view the rating of teachers is a task of tremendous difficulty and complexity. To the variables such as pupil, school plant, system, administrator, and teacher differences—to all the complex differences involved in the learning process, we must add the human frailties to which those who will evaluate may fall prey. The possibility of creating an objective means which will rate all teachers fairly seems most remote.

This is well illustrated by a study made by the United States Air Force in 1956, reported to a St. Louis, Missouri meeting of the National Education Association at which Alberta Teachers' Association delegates were present. The USAF made an expensive and detailed study in an attempt to establish what the criteria were of a good instructor for the purposes of setting promotion policies in the instructional staff. Leading statisticians and job evaluators were employed, and their findings were that a factor in teaching success which appeared significant in one instructional situation would have no bearing whatsoever in another one. The only factor which appeared as a constant in the study was popularity with students. Because of the danger that the popularity might be sought by instructors as a means of gaining promotion, even this factor was of no use in the application of the study. Because the complete study contained some classified information, it has not been published and the information which The Alberta Teachers' Association has on hand, is based on our delegates' discussions at the St. Louis Conference with those who did the study.

All teachers are different, and this is as it should be. We would no more want all teachers to be alike than we want all pupils or all citizens to be alike. Those of us in the teaching profession who have delved into the complexities of psychometrics and educational statistics are only too keenly aware that we must draw very generalized conclusions from these devices, much as we try to sharpen them. Who is to say what the effect of any one teacher's work will be on a class? Who is to measure the contribution any one teacher makes to the total staff effort?

It is a well-known fact that there are those teaching who should not be in the classroom. What should be remembered is that these incompetent teachers are a far greater burden to their fellow teachers than they could ever be to anyone else except the student in front of them. We do not want the incompetent person to teach anywhere, for any pay, large or small. To this end we have a well established procedure, stated clearly and definitely, and tried by long use. It is the merit principle which calls for careful screening of candidates who wish to enter our Faculty of Education. It calls for further careful screening and observation of these students as they pass through their teacher education, and rigid standards for those who would graduate. It calls for a supervisory program in service which will ensure

professional growth, and it calls for retention practices which will ensure that the talented people we want will come into, and remain in, teaching. And finally, it calls for a system of eliminating those who prove incompetent in the field. We feel that any attempt to implement merit scales on a group which has not been hired under the merit principle will simply result in aggravation of present recruitment and retention difficulties and in breakdown of rapport between supervisor and teacher, will cause envy and fear to spring up to corrupt the group effort that teaching must be, and will hinder the implementation of the merit principle itself.

Research and investigation into this very complex matter have brought out again and again the futility of arbitrarily imposing such a scheme on those who are to work under it. This valuable lesson must not be lost upon us in Alberta. The Alberta Teachers' Association is not opposed to salary policy changes, but it wishes to investigate very closely any policy which will pose a challenge to the merit principle as we have defined it. If merit pay scales are to improve instruction in our schools, we believe that the first step is to perfect some form of merit rating not for salary purposes, but for the purpose of improving classroom instruction. While teacher competence, quality of instruction, and educational results are a concern of the taxpaying public, the means by which these are achieved are a professional matter. The teaching profession must resist attempts to usurp those responsibilities which are professional in nature. We do not believe that some form of merit pay scales, hastily imposed and cheaply administered, is the answer to a very complex professional problem. We do not believe that good teachers now giving all the service they can offer to their pupils and their communities will somehow uncover more means for service under a merit salary scale. Nor do we believe that teachers with less devotion and concern will be able to find in merit salary denials the means for self-improvement. The problem is much deeper than this, and the means to solve it are matters of great concern to those of us engaged in teaching.

Merit rating and merit pay scales are not new in the education field. Those who propose them in Canadian education should keep in mind that they have been tried for many years in the United States, and that merit rating for salary purposes is on the decline. The following tables and explanatory material will illustrate this fact. They are taken from *Teacher Merit and Teacher Salary*, New York State Teachers Association, 1957.

Table 1, Trend in Prevalance of Merit Rating¹

Item	School Year Ending					
	1923	1928	1931	1941	1951	1956
Number of Cities ² Surveyed	941	1532	1465	1737	1597	1973
Percent Definitely Rating All Teachers	57%	43%	46%	40%	44%	40%

*¹For any purpose

*²Urban places over 2,500 population.

Trend data on the uses of rating are not exactly comparable. However, it is known that 37 percent of the districts reporting use of merit rating in

1928 used it as a supervisory aid. Recent studies show that it was used for this purpose by 73 percent of those reporting the use of rating in 1941, 63 percent in 1951, and 77 percent in 1956. The table below shows the trend in other common uses in recent years.

Table 2, Recent Trends in Use of Ratings

Use	Percent of Cities' with Plans using Ratings		
	(By School Year Ending)		
	1941	1951	1956
To decide reappointment of non-tenure teachers	69%	64%	71%
To recommend for permanent appointment	43	51	56
To select for promotion	42	32	36
In paying regular increments	35	19	16

¹Urban places over 2,500 population.

In the earlier years (through 1931) definite rating plans were reported by 70 percent or more of the larger cities and a smaller percentage of the smaller ones. A 1956 study shows that the proportion of the largest cities (over 100,000 population) using the device had dropped to 39 percent (from 67 percent in 1941 and 55 percent in 1951). The percent of the smallest cities (2,500-9,999 population) using it fluctuated only slightly, remaining at about 40 percent over the nearly 30-year period. The 10,000-29,999 population group showed a slight increase, while the cities of 30,000 - 100,000 population showed a decrease in usage of somewhat less magnitude than that evident in the largest cities. These trends are consistent with the 1925 finding that rating was more successful in the smaller cities.

Use of the Merit Rating Technique for Salary Purposes

It is extremely difficult to establish firm trend data on the use of merit rating for salary purposes, because data collected in the different surveys were in varying forms. A doctoral study by Young, published in 1933, noted that the varying nature of the data available for the period 1918 through 1928 made it difficult to cite any definite trend. He concluded that during this period a small, rather constant number of school systems had been using teaching efficiency ratings to help determine the amount of salary.

Buckingham's 1922 survey of 156 cities having over 25,000 population showed that about 70 percent of the cities which had definite rating plans used the ratings for salary purposes. This probably meant that about half the 156 cities surveyed made some use of merit ratings in salary determination. The National Education Association's 1923 survey of over 900 cities of all sizes found that 63 percent of those districts which gave ratings (see Table 1) used them for salary purposes. This apparently meant that about a third of the 900 cities based salaries to some extent on merit ratings.

About ten percent of the districts reporting to the National Education Association that they definitely rated teachers in 1928 said the rating directly

and automatically affected salaries. This would have represented about four percent of the over 1,500 cities surveyed. However, the report commented that a large number of cities granted no increments to the few teachers rated unsatisfactory, and that 29 percent of the cities surveyed reported supermaximum salaries. About half of the supermaximums were granted on the basis of superior rating and performance, sometimes in combination with additional training.

The National Education Association's 1931 survey showed that about 17 percent of the districts which definitely rated as to quality of service used the rating in determining the teacher's place on the regular salary schedule. This would have represented approximately eight percent of over 1,400 cities surveyed. Forty-four percent of the cities reporting in 1930-31 noted the availability of supermaximum salaries. Fifty-seven percent of these were granted on the basis of superior rating and performance.

Data for 1941 through 1956 were collected by the National Education Association in approximately the same form and are reported in the table below.

Table 3, Recent Trends in Use of Rating in Salary Determination

Item	Percent of All Cities (By School Year Ending)		
	1941	1951	1956
Giving definite rating to all teachers	40%	44%	40%
Using rating in salary determination for:			
—Paying regular increment ¹	13	10	9
—Fixing size of increment ¹	7	3	3
—Selecting for supermaximum	6	6	4
Total number of cities reporting	1737	1597	1973

¹These are apt to overlap.

The foregoing data would seem to indicate that the peak of activity in using merit rating for salary purposes probably had been reached before 1930, and that the **use of merit rating for all salary purposes showed a definite decrease for the period 1941 through 1956.**

The Alberta Teachers' Association believes that there is a natural merit rating in instances when school boards have a wide choice of teachers to fill various teaching positions. These school boards in the province which are offering relatively superior salaries and working conditions find that teachers are in competition with each other to secure these positions. These boards can utilize the merit principle as we have defined it, not only in recruitment, but in their promotion policies, because the staff that they have hired is of a calibre which permits selection in the awarding of administrative and supervisory positions. The Association believes that this is the natural form which merit rating and merit pay should take.

If merit rating has value, and can be demonstrated to be workable, the Association takes the position that the onus of proof of these things lies on those who are proposing merit rating. The Association is most

willing to discuss it in committee with the trustees' association and the Department of Education, as is being done in British Columbia and Saskatchewan. Surely the proponents of the scheme have the responsibility of working it out in some detail so that we may discuss it with them point by point. The Rochester case study quoted in our supplementary memoranda, the declining use of merit rating to set salary scales in both industry and education, the complexity of the problem of creating an instrument to measure teachers' services objectively, the dangers to teacher morale, the harmful influence of merit pay on total group output, and the futility of imposing merit pay scales arbitrarily—all these militate against adoption of merit pay scales. We await with interest a chance to discuss in detail a merit pay scheme put forward by those who believe it can operate successfully.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- S1. A study should be made by the Alberta Advisory Committee on Educational Research respecting the feasibility of merit rating as a practical device for the improvement of instruction.**
- S2. The Alberta Teachers' Association should cooperate with the Faculty of Education in the preparation of an appropriate merit rating scale, if such a study indicates its advisability and practicability.**
- S3. The merit principle defined in the foregoing should be observed in the recruitment, education, hiring, and retention of Alberta teachers.**
- S4. Merit rating scales should not be imposed unilaterally by school boards.**

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In the presentation of a bill to the Legislative Assembly in May, 1944, the Alberta Teachers' Association stated that the security of tenure was the essential basis of the system. Albertans are good enough. We believe that this can be well illustrated by a study of some other jurisdictions. The history of Alberta teachers' tenure would be a long one. The tenure regulations as they appear in the *Teachers' Act* still seem to illustrate their application with the same old meaning that have come down to us.

We believe that these regulations will show that principals and superintendents should have at least the same tenure as teachers. We believe that we can demonstrate that the present *Teachers' Act* is a very good one. We believe that our laws should show that the present system of protection is worthy of the best. We believe that it is the right of the teacher to have security of tenure. We believe that we can demonstrate that the present regulations for the duration of protection and superintendents protect the teacher of education in an excellent manner. We believe that we can demonstrate that the present regulations are a very good one. We believe that we can demonstrate that the present regulations are a very good one.

PART II

TENURE FOR ALBERTA TEACHERS

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In the presentation of a brief to the Cameron Commission in May, 1958, The Alberta Teachers' Association stated that the security of tenure in school systems outside of the cities of Alberta was not good enough. We believe that this can be well illustrated by a study of some case histories involving tenure of Alberta teachers. We would first like to quote the tenure regulations as they appear in *The School Act*, and then to illustrate their application with the cases of teachers who have come under them.

We believe that these cases will show that principals and vice-principals should have at least the same tenure as teachers. We believe that we can demonstrate that the present transfer regulations are unfair to teachers. We believe that our case studies will show that the present system of probation is contrary to the basic tenet that a person has the right to a fair hearing before conviction. We believe that we can illustrate that the present machinery for the dismissal of principals and vice-principals places the Minister of Education in an awkward position because the evidence on which he must make his decision may be based on gossip and personal animosity. Finally, we believe that we can demonstrate that the implementation of our recommendations (38 to 41) in our main brief would provide a simple, fair, and orderly method for the termination of teachers' contracts.

CHAPTER 2

SUMMARY OF TENURE REGULATIONS IN THE SCHOOL ACT

PROBATION

352. (1) When a dispute or disagreement arises between a board and a teacher with respect to the termination of a contract between the board and the teacher, either party to the dispute or disagreement may make application to the Minister to refer the dispute to the Board of Reference.

(2) No application shall be made in any case where the contract has been terminated with the approval in writing of the Minister or where the contract has been in effect for less than twelve months.

At the end of the first year of employment with a school board a teacher is subject to dismissal at the sole discretion of the school board. There is no appeal. This regulation applies to all appointments regardless of academic and professional qualifications and experience. Every time a teacher accepts an offer of employment from a school board he is on "probation" for one year and is subject to dismissal without cause.

Provisions for a "probationary period" for teachers are of recent origin, through an amendment to *The School Act* in 1957.

TERMINATION

340. (1) Unless it obtains the approval of the Minister to do so, no board shall give a notice to terminate a contract effective in any month except July.

(2) A notice to terminate a contract effective in the month of July shall be given to the teacher by the board on or before the preceding fifteenth of June.

341. (1) Unless he obtains the approval of the Minister to do so, no teacher shall give a notice to terminate a contract effective in any month except July or August.

(2) Unless he obtains the approval of the Minister to do so, no teacher shall give a notice to terminate a contract under which he has not yet rendered service.

(3) A notice to terminate a contract effective in the month of July or August shall be given to the board by the teacher on or before the preceding fifteenth day of June, unless the teacher enters into a contract with another school board in the Province in which case the notice may be given on or before the preceding fifteenth day of July.

(4) If a teacher enters into a contract of employment with another board his notice to terminate his existing contract of employment shall, in addition to complying with the other requirements of this section, be given within eight days after the new contract is made.

342. A notice to terminate a contract may be given either by delivering it to the person to whom it is addressed, or by sending it in a duly addressed and prepaid envelope by registered mail, and in the latter case the notice shall be deemed to have been given upon the day on which it is mailed.

343. (1) If a teacher notifies the secretary in writing of a post office address to which notices may be sent, the secretary shall send all notices to that address.

(2) If the teacher gives no notification under subsection (1), any notice sent by the secretary by mail shall be deemed to be properly addressed if addressed to the teacher at his latest known post office address.

After more than one year of employment a teacher may be dismissed by a school board, but if the teacher is of the opinion that the dismissal is unwarranted he may make application to the Minister of Education to refer the dismissal to the Board of Reference (*The School Act*, sections 351 to 357).

TRANSFER

348. (1) A board may transfer a teacher from one school or room in its charge to another at any time during the school year.

(2) The board shall give to the teacher concerned seven days' notice in writing of the transfer.

(3) Within seven days after receiving notice of the transfer, the teacher may request, in writing, an opportunity to be heard before the board.

(4) If a hearing is requested, the transfer shall not be effective until the teacher has been heard before the board or a committee thereof.

(5) The board shall not under this section transfer a teacher who has been designated to be a principal, vice-principal or assistant principal under section 370.

349. The board of a division may pay all or part of the expenses necessarily incurred by a teacher in moving himself, his family and his personal and household effects as a result of a transfer from one school to another within the division.

A teacher may be transferred to any school in the district or division under the jurisdiction of the school board on seven days' notice at any time of the year. There is an appeal provided for in *The School Act* but the appeal is to the school board that made the transfer. In practice this has not been satisfactory. Transfers are at the sole discretion of the school board and an appeal to the school board that made the transfer is analogous to appealing to a judge to reverse his own decision.

The present regulations with respect to transfers of teachers have been in force in Alberta since the large units of administration were organized.

PRINCIPALS AND VICE-PRINCIPALS

370. (1) In a school where there are two or more teachers, the board

- (a) shall designate one teacher to be principal of the school, and
- (b) may designate one or more teachers to be vice-principals or assistant principals.

(2) In a school where there are eight or more teachers the board shall designate one or more teachers to be vice-principals or assistant principals.

(3) In computing the number of teachers, a person teaching less than two and one-half days per week in the school shall not be counted.

(4) The board may designate a teacher to be an acting principal or an acting vice-principal or an acting assistant principal for a period to terminate on or before the thirtieth day of June, next following.

371. (1) If a teacher is designated to be a principal, vice-principal or assistant principal of a school, the designation shall remain in effect until terminated.

(2) The designation may be terminated

- (a) by the board passing a resolution terminating the designation and giving at least thirty days' notice in writing to the designee, or
- (b) by the designee giving at least thirty days' notice in writing to the board.

(3) No notice shall be given that is effective in any month other than July unless the consent of the Minister to a notice effective at some other time has first been obtained.

(4) A notice effective in the month of July shall be given before the preceding fifteenth day of June.

372. (1) If a teacher receives a notice of termination of designation effective in the month of July he may, within seven days of the receipt of the notice, request in writing a hearing before the board.

(2) If a hearing is requested, the board, within fourteen days of the receipt of the request, shall provide an opportunity for the teacher to appear before the board or a committee thereof to hear the reasons for the withdrawal of the designation and to reply thereto.

(3) If the teacher is dissatisfied with the reasons given, and the board does not withdraw its notice, he may appeal, within seven days, to the Minister who shall cause an investigation to be made and who may in his discretion confirm or disallow the termination of the designation.

373. (1) The termination of the contract of a teacher also terminates his designation, if any, under section 370.

(2) The termination of designation under section 371 does not terminate the contract of the teacher.

Principals and vice-principals are under two contracts, one as teacher and the other as principal or vice-principal. If the principal receives a notice of termination of his contract as a teacher he may appeal to the Board of Reference. However, if he receives notice of termination of his designation as principal or vice-principal he does not have the right to appeal to the Board of Reference. He may appeal to the school board for a hearing and if he is not satisfied with the reasons given by the school board for the termination of his designation as principal or vice-principal he may appeal to the Minister of Education who makes an investigation and "who may in his discretion confirm or disallow the termination of the designation".

Until recently, notices of termination of designation as principal or vice-principal were subject to appeal to the Board of Reference in the same way as notice of termination of contract with teachers. This tenure right has since been removed for teachers appointed to principal's or vice-principal's positions.

CHAPTER 3

CASE HISTORIES

Following are summaries of typical cases in which The Alberta Teachers' Association is of the opinion that teachers have not had a "fair trial". There has been a sufficient number of cases of this kind to have an adverse effect on the morale of the teaching staff throughout the province, and on the recruitment and retention of teachers. It is more than likely that students in high schools, who have seen how some teachers have been treated, will hesitate to enter a profession where they themselves may be subject to the same kind of treatment. Because of inadequate tenure protection many teachers who have had years of successful teaching experience, have left teaching for other occupations.

CASE NUMBER 1, PROBATIONARY PERIOD

A teacher with 30 years of successful experience, mainly in Red Deer, accepted a position as teacher and vice-principal in the Mynarski Park School District No. 5012 in 1957. In June, 1958 he received a notice of termination of his contract. According to section 352(2) of *The School Act*, no appeal could be made to the Board of Reference because his contract had been in effect for less than 12 months. The Alberta Teachers' Association appointed a committee to investigate the complaint that this teacher had been dismissed "without cause". The committee met on July 4, 1958. The official trustee was requested to attend the meeting in order that the investigating committee could be informed of the board's reasons for the termination of this teacher's contract. The official trustee did not reply to the invitation to attend the inquiry.

The committee found that the past record of the teacher was excellent. He had favourable reports from several superintendents including the superintendent in the adjacent division. The committee found that prior to receiving the notice of termination the teacher had not been told by the official trustee or the principal that his work was not satisfactory. The committee found that the official trustee had dismissed the teacher without consulting the superintendent of the district. The committee found that the official trustee had made no investigation of the work of the teacher. The committee found that the official trustee had held office since March, 1958. It was the opinion of the committee that dismissal of the teacher had likely been based on trifling complaints made by parents to the official trustee.

CASE NUMBER 2, PROBATIONARY PERIOD

In June, 1958, three teachers on the staff at Guthrie School in the Normandy School District No. 4986, RCAF Station, Namao, received notice of termination of their contracts. They were unable to appeal to the Board

of Reference because their contracts had been in effect for less than 12 months. The Alberta Teachers' Association appointed a committee to investigate the complaint that these teachers had been dismissed "without cause". The committee met on July 5, 1958. The official trustee was requested to attend the meeting in order that the investigating committee could be given the reasons for the termination of these teachers' contracts. The official trustee did not reply to the invitation to attend the meeting.

The committee found that the three teachers have excellent teaching records. This was established by statements made by the principal and by reports from superintendents. The committee found that the official trustee did not consult with the superintendent of the district before dismissing the teachers. The committee found that prior to receiving the notices of termination of their contracts the teachers had not been told by the official trustee or the principal that their work had been unsatisfactory. The committee found that the reasons given by the official trustee to the teachers were that he wished to make room for specialists in home economics and industrial arts, that he wanted "better" qualified teachers, and that these three teachers had only minimum qualifications and could be dismissed without difficulty because they were "on probation". The committee found that one of the teachers had already been replaced by another teacher with the same qualifications but with less experience. The committee found that one of the three teachers dismissed has over two years of teacher education. The committee found that **four** teachers had been dismissed because the official trustee wished to have positions available for **two** teachers with special qualifications in home economics and industrial arts.

CASE NUMBER 3, TRANSFERS OF TEACHERS

This case involved two teachers employed by the Bonnyville School Division.

The first teacher was on the Ardmore staff of the Bonnyville School Division and in September, 1955 was transferred to a school at Iron River, which is several miles from Ardmore, on a road that is impassable in any kind of bad weather. This teacher had taught in this division for several years and had an excellent record. When she asked why she was being transferred she was told that one teacher had to go to Iron River and that she had been selected because of her good record as a teacher. It was admitted by the superintendent and the board that her seniority on the staff at Ardmore had not been considered. The general secretary of The Alberta Teachers' Association met with the school board and superintendent and tried to persuade them to change their decision. When the board refused to do so the teacher asked for a release of engagement, which the board granted quite reluctantly because it meant one teacher less in a division that was already short of teachers.

This teacher remained unemployed for several months and then accepted a position to teach in a school close to her home and in the same division.

The other case was not so easy to settle. The teacher was on the Cold Lake staff and was transferred to a school 27 miles from her home. Because of personal reasons, this teacher could not demand a release of contract. The general secretary of the Association met with the board on behalf of this teacher and tried to point out to the board that it would not be possible for the teacher to live in the teacherage at the school because she was taking care of her father who was quite elderly and in poor health. It was also pointed out to the school board that it might be difficult, if not impossible, for the teacher to get to the school on days when the roads were bad. The following winter was unusually severe, and when the teacher was not able to get to school on several occasions because of severe weather and bad roads, the school board requested her to resign. She refused to do so, and in June, 1956, the school board terminated her contract as a teacher. Application for an appeal was made to the Board of Reference. Before the case was heard the school board withdrew the notice of termination of contract.

In August, 1956, the chief superintendent of schools for the Department of Education persuaded the school board to offer this teacher a position in a school at Cold Lake, which is only a few miles from Grande Centre where the teacher lives.

CASE NUMBER 4, TERMINATION OF DESIGNATION OF PRINCIPAL

In June, 1957, the principal of a 23- or 24-room school in a large and well established town in Alberta received notice of termination of designation as principal under section 372(1) and (2) of the Act. He appealed to the school board and at the hearing obtained no reasons that, in his opinion and in the opinion of The Alberta Teachers' Association, warranted his dismissal. Therefore, an appeal was made to the Minister of Education under section 372(3). The Minister appointed an investigating officer. At the hearing, the principal was represented by the solicitor for The Alberta Teachers' Association, and the general secretary. The meeting was attended by the chairman of the board and four other members, as well as the principal and his two representatives. The investigating officer outlined the following procedure to be followed in the inquiry:

- (a) evidence to be submitted by the board,
- (b) replies to be made by the principal and/or his representatives,
- (c) general discussion.

It should be noted that this procedure appears to be a fair and proper manner of conducting an inquiry of this kind, and The Alberta Teachers' Association solicitor and general secretary agreed to the proposal, as did the school board.

There were four complaints made by the members of the board. One member of the board said the students had lost respect for their principal and refused openly to cooperate with him and his staff, and that some had

left the school because of their unsatisfactory educational advancement. Members of the school board were forced to admit that these charges were based on interviews with four out of 300 students attending the school. It was established that the four students had recently been disciplined by the principal.

A second complaint was that a number of the high school teachers were dissatisfied with their principal. Evidence was submitted to the effect that a large majority of the members of the staff (all except two) had expressed confidence in the principal and approved of his methods of discipline.

A third complaint was that in the town, there was general dissatisfaction with the principal. It was established that there had been some "gossip" about the suspensions of two pupils, but there was no evidence submitted that the complaints had been directed at the principal.

The fourth complaint was that the principal lacked administrative ability, because of his way of handling the suspensions referred to previously. It was established that the suspensions had been made by the principal on the recommendation of his staff. It was established that not a single case of dissatisfaction of one or more of the parents or the ratepayers had been communicated to the principal before March of 1957.

During the inquiry it did not seem to be difficult to answer the board's rather sweeping reasons for terminating the principal's designation. However, at the close of the meeting a member of the board said that there were a number of people who wished to discuss, privately and confidentially, some matters relating to the termination of the principal's contract. Our solicitor and the general secretary objected to this type of investigation. Despite this, the investigating officer stated that he would hear what these people had to say. The next day he told the Association representatives that he had received information in confidence which he could not disclose. The Association representatives objected to this procedure, stating that the principal should have the right to cross-examine these claims. In spite of this, the investigating officer refused to disclose the substance of the charges which he had heard "in camera". It seems apparent that the decision of the investigating officer must have been made on what he heard in private session, for the evidence presented at the open hearing did not justify dismissal. It is a matter of record that as a result of his report to the Minister of Education, the termination of the principal's designation was upheld by the Minister.

CHAPTER 4

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

There is considerable evidence to indicate that one of the major factors interfering with the recruitment and retention of teachers is the lack of social status associated with the teaching profession. The Alberta Teachers' Association believes that the existing tenure regulations play a large part in this social attitude. High school students who plan to attend university will certainly be directed away from the choice of teaching as a career when they witness the often shoddy and unpleasant treatment of their teachers in matters of tenure. Many good teachers and principals are leaving key positions in town and village schools to escape to the relatively orderly existence of the city systems where local pressures and unfair application of the present tenure regulations are at a minimum.

The Alberta Teachers' Association does not hold any brief for "absolute security" for its members. Even if the merit principle with its careful screening before hiring, its competent and constant supervision during service, and its constant in-service education, were in effect in Alberta, we know that some teachers would be in classrooms who should not be there. We believe that a fair and proper system by which transfers and terminations of contract may be carried out must be developed. We believe that a properly certificated teacher or administrator with adequate teacher education should be subject to dismissal "with cause", but that he should be entitled to an appeal to a neutral body so that he may hear the accusations against him, and have the opportunity to cross-examine his accusers under oath. Recommendations 39 and 40, submitted in our original brief, would, in our opinion, provide an orderly and fair procedure for dealing with terminations of contracts with teacher, principal, or vice-principal. Recommendation 41 from our original brief suggests a proper procedure for dealing with disputes concerning the transfer of teachers.

RECOMMENDATIONS

39. A school board should have the right to terminate a contract with a teacher, principal or vice-principal by giving thirty days' notice at any time during the year, except July and August, to be subject to appeal to the Board of Reference.
40. A teacher, principal or vice-principal should have the right to resign
 - (a) by giving thirty days' notice between June 1 and July 31, to take effect in July or August,
 - (b) by giving thirty days' notice at any other time during the year, such notice of termination to be subject to appeal to the Board of Reference by the school board.
41. All proposed transfers of teachers not mutually agreed upon should be subject to appeal to a committee of the school board and the local teachers' association, or to a neutral body, where evidence is given under oath and subject to cross-examination.

SUPPLEMENTARY MEMORANDA

SUPPLEMENTARY MEMORANDUM 1

MERIT RATING AND MONETARY INCENTIVES IN BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY¹

SUMMARY

The Committee's study of salary practice in business and industry fails to substantiate the common assumption that in business and industry the practice of determining salaries on a merit basis is universal and successfully applied. An analysis of the limited statistical data available and supplemental information from experts in the field of personnel management shows that formal merit rating plans are not widely used by business and industry. On the contrary, a study of the literature on industrial psychology reveals strong differences of opinion among industrial management experts as to the usefulness and desirability of the merit rating technique.

Those who believe in the soundness of the principle are devoting much time and money to the solution of the multitude of problems they have encountered, problems quite similar to those experienced when the theory is applied in public education. Business and industry seem to have advanced no further than education in solving these complex problems; even the forms used closely resemble those used in the schools. The prerequisites recognized by industry to date are almost identical to those evolved by public education as discussed in Chapters 5 and 6.

The picture was well summarized by Stephen Habbe of the National Industrial Conference Board in 1956:

Merit rating has a long history. Rating methods, as well as the basic idea of rating, have been criticized from time to time. Possibly as a result of some of this criticism, present rating plans have been improved and are not as crude as the early ones. And new plans are always being tried. In addition, special attention is being given today to the training of the supervisors who make the ratings and who discuss them afterwards with the workers. No doubt those companies that are convinced that it is important to identify and reward employees who perform their jobs well will continue to work on a broad front to strengthen their merit-rating programs.

Where merit rating is used in business and industry, it is more likely to be for developmental purposes than for salary purposes. Where used in salary determination, it is generally as one of several factors and not the primary one. Business and industry, like education, have learned that the success of any compensation program is largely dependent upon the general "climate" of the organization, i.e., the type of personnel management and working conditions existing.

¹From Chapter 7 of *Teacher Merit and Teacher Salary*, New York State Teachers Association, Albany, New York, 1957.

The Money Incentive

The use of merit rating for wage and salary determination is closely related to another issue which has received considerable attention in business and industry, that is, the value of money as an incentive for the increased production of individuals. Indeed, the success of "merit salaries" depends upon the extent to which money alone promotes better and more work. Because of the intense interest in developing the most effective techniques for motivating employee performance, industrial psychologists and management experts for many years have been studying ways of improving the productive capacity of individuals and considerable research has been done on incentives. *This research, years ago, upset the theory of the potency of the money incentive alone.* One consulting psychologist observed recently in a popularly written column, "Twenty-two years of research on the motives that animate employees has shown that pay is not the main motive nor are pay increases the things employees want most . . . they must also know they are getting the amount of pay the business can afford and that their work is being appreciated." Non-financial incentives are frequently of great value.

The section on monetary incentives summarizes some of the considerations found to be basic to the success of wage incentive plans in business and industry which also are pertinent to public education.

USES OF MERIT RATING

"Merit rating" as used herein refers, as in Chapters 5 and 6, to the technique itself, regardless of the purposes for which the resultant ratings may be utilized. The uses made of the ratings are detailed under a separate heading.

Prevalence of Merit Rating

It is difficult to arrive at precise figures on the proportion of business and industrial firms using merit rating at any given time. No over-all status studies appear to have been made. However, the several studies of varying samples of large companies which have been made during the past 20 years do not show as widespread use as is commonly assumed.

A 1940 study of 160 large companies showed that just over a fourth of them were using merit rating with another 10 percent planning to use it. Two different 1947 studies of large companies showed that about a third of those surveyed were using merit rating. A 1951 survey found that the number of companies using merit rating was increasing, but not rapidly, with less than half of the companies surveyed then using it.

A 1953 survey found it to be used more frequently in evaluating the performance of the rank and file than in rating supervisory employees. This is consistent with the results of a 1951 survey reported by the American Management Association of 130 merit rating plans in operation in 75 companies. This study showed that 42 percent of the plans were for manual

employees, 32 percent for clerical employees, and 26 percent for administrative, professional, and supervisory employees.

Types of Uses

Even the companies which have merit rating plans in operation do not make wide use of the ratings in determining salaries for employees within the same job classification. Merit rating in industry apparently had its *first impetus in the 1920's (long after it had been introduced in teaching)*. It appears to have been an outgrowth of the Army promotion system used in World War I. *It received further impetus in the 1940's when the federal wage freeze order made it impossible to grant salary increases unless some change in service could be demonstrated.*

Since the 1940's the emphasis in merit rating in industry, as in education, has been on the improvement of the employee's performance rather than on its direct use in determining his salary. Even the forms used emphasize the developmental aspects: How is the employee now performing? What are his deficiencies? What improvement is he making?

The American Management Association's 1951 report on the merit rating plans in operation in 75 large companies showed the following to be the most common uses made of the ratings. (Since companies often reported more than one purpose, the percentages will total more than 100.)

Use Made	Percent of Companies
For merit salary or wage increases	37%
To tell employee where he stood	36
To determine training needs	31
To determine promotability	28
To evaluate	24
To determine whether employee should be transferred	17

A 1951 report of the National Industrial Conference Board showed that rating plans were used for at least 15 different purposes which could be broken down, basically, into two major categories: (1) administrative (e.g. whom to promote, whom to transfer, whom to recommend for salary increases) and (2) clinical (e.g., to help the employee understand himself and to do a better job.) While it is difficult to reconcile the two in the same plan, some companies felt that their results could be used both clinically and administratively. The purposes as listed were:

To give employees an idea of how they are doing.

To identify promotable employees.

For purposes of salary administration.

To provide a basis for a supervisor-employee interview.

To help train supervisors to know their workers better.

- To discover areas where additional training is needed.
- To identify employees for layoff in bad times.
- To identify employees who may be in "wrong" jobs.
- To help check the effectiveness of the company's selection procedure or other research use.
- For selection during rehiring periods.
- To comply with union contract provisions.
- For use in grievance interviews.
- To focus executives' attention on the effectiveness of their organization and to provide a foundation for organization planning and development.
- To aid in assuring employees of appropriate individual recognition and to assist in development of competent personnel to carry out the company's operation efficiently and successfully.
- To obtain a check on all probationary and terminated employees.

A 1955 article advocating the use of "scientific personnel evaluation or merit rating for junior grades of employees" as an "accepted tool of enlightened industrial management" listed the following benefits in such a plan for evaluating engineers:

- As a basis for helpful counsel between rater and ratee.
- To bring the engineer and his supervisor together.
- To help improve supervisor judgment.
- To keep employees from being "lost in the shuffle."
- Substitutes fact for fancy.

EXPERIENCE WITH MERIT RATING

Problems Encountered

Business and industry, like education, have encountered innumerable problems in their attempts to appraise or rate employees, even where results are not used for salary purposes. Many of these problems are of a technical nature and relate to the validity of the form itself or to the accuracy of the ratings achieved. Factors frequently cited as contributing to inaccuracy include: rater bias, defects in the form (e.g., it may have a built-in inequity), use of subjective ratings where objective records are available, failure of ratees to accept ratings as desirable, rater's hesitancy to record accurately for fear of what may happen to him or his people as a result, and failure to train raters properly. Labor unions are likely to take an uncompromising stand if a member's job is threatened by a low rating.

It would seem that many companies would like to use job analysis and merit rating for wage and salary administration. However, they have learned that this use of merit rating frequently results in problems and disagreements which are next to impossible to resolve in a fair and amicable manner.

The use of merit ratings for salary purposes is primarily a control device, and may create as many problems as it solves. A company which is rating for developmental purposes usually finds that it needs a different type of information for salary purposes. The assumption that the better producer is the better worker does not always hold. His results may come because of the cooperation he is getting from the group as a whole.

Supervisors or foremen may feel no obligation to administer wages and salaries objectively. Some of them feel that failure to grant regular increases is troublesome. Assuming the ratings to be accurate, there is still the question of expressing the difference between "superior" and "outstanding" in monetary terms. Unions generally question the failures of wage differentials based on rating reports.

Solutions Attempted

In an attempt to overcome the difficulties encountered in rating employee performance, industry is moving from highly structured forms with many items to relatively simple ones with few items and room for the description of noteworthy items. Group appraisal is being substituted for individual judgments (to overcome rater bias), and considerable attention is given to the training of those who do the rating. The forms themselves are generally kept under continuous scrutiny with the raters participating in the original development and subsequent revisions of the forms used. There is quite general recognition of the fact that the plan must be developed for the particular company which is to use it. Some companies are attempting to separate the descriptive or reporting function from the judgmental or evaluative one by use of a "forced choice" technique wherein one person reports on a series of items without knowing their relative significance and another person in the personnel office makes the evaluation on the basis of the recorded descriptions.

Guiding Principles Recommended

An analysis of a number of discussions of successful and unsuccessful merit plans indicates that the following considerations are basic to the establishment of a formal merit rating plan regardless of its purpose.

1. Its purpose should be clearly stated and well understood—a plan should not be adopted just because someone else has it.
2. The rating form should be developed by the individual company by scientific procedures and be appropriate to that company's own organization; it must be reliable and consistent.
3. The persons using it should be well trained and accept it; otherwise it may become just "more front office red tape."
4. Raters should help in developing the plan and understand it thoroughly; all should agree on objectives and use same standards. Plan should also be understood by those being rated.

5. Subjectivity should be kept to a minimum; as many judgments as possible should be made on the basis of actual records.
6. Ratings should not be allowed to stand alone, but rather be interpreted in the light of other information about the employee (e.g., age, education, years with the company, health, productivity, etcetera).
7. The immediate supervisor is the best one to rate, although it may be desirable to have others supplement his rating. Use of multiple ratings tends to reduce the "halo" effect. It is wise to have two or more persons, working independently, rate each individual.
8. It is not wise to have ratings by subordinates; such ratings tend to lead to a "popularity" contest.
9. Ratings should be discussed with the employee.
10. Factors included should be pertinent to "on-the-job" performance and those in which employees were found to differ the most.

Other important considerations include the provision of an opportunity for the rater and ratee to discuss the rating, the provision of adequate grievance machinery, and the development of a form which is useful for more than one purpose and practical and economical of operation (no more than 15 employees can be satisfactorily rated by each rater).

MONEY AS AN INCENTIVE TO PRODUCTION

Using merit rating to determine salaries or wages is but a part of the use of money incentives to stimulate increased or better production. Much that has been learned about monetary incentives generally can be applied to the use of merit ratings in the determination of salary or wages.

In 1945 Elton Mayo wrote that the earlier "efficiency experts had assumed the primacy of the financial incentive. In this they were wrong; not until the conditions of working group formation¹ were satisfied did the . . . financial incentives come into operation at all".

W. F. Whyte and his students analyzed the operation of the money incentive in several factory situations. He concluded that money was only one of a number of rewards and punishments that might be involved in an incentive situation. He found that

- the worker also responded to the total factory situation
- the reactions of the individual to the money incentive depended upon his relationship to his fellow workers
- the theory upon which such incentive programs are based apparently applies only to a small fraction of the population who will ignore group pressures to exceed group set norms

¹This refers to general working conditions in a given organization.

- persons who ignore the group pressures are extremely individualistic and highly acquisitive
- the norms set by an individual work group may be low or high, depending largely upon the relations between this group and the larger organization.

He concluded that management should recognize that financial incentives are both a technical engineering problem and a human relations problem and suggested that management base its actions upon observations of the way people actually behave rather than on the theory of how they should behave.

The Esso Standard Oil Study

In 1953, the Employee Relations Department of Esso Standard Oil Company made a study of incentives in industry. Although the original subject was wage incentives, research led to other financial and non-financial incentives.

Financial Incentives. They found that financial incentives could be divided into two types: direct and indirect. The direct ones included: wage incentive plans (greater earnings through greater output), and other plans such as supervisory and executive incentives, profit sharing plans, bonuses, and stock ownership plans (wherein reward for extra output may be on a deferred basis). The indirect ones included: fair pay scales, equitable job classification systems, good promotional policies, and fringe benefits. They found that:

although the theory of wage incentives has been fairly generally approved by management, complete acceptance has not been granted the technique. Among the competitive advantages management has attributed to wage incentives are (a) opportunities for reducing supervision required, (b) attraction of better workers, (c) promotion of greater efficiency, and (d) the satisfaction of labor's demands for wage increases. In spite of these, *the difficulties encountered by earlier practitioners and the lack of more general acceptance have caused many managements to seek effective substitutes for wage incentives.*

Non-financial Incentives. As they moved into the area of non-financial incentives, the Esso researchers became more and more aware of their value in emphasizing and dignifying the individual. They found that:

non-financial incentives encourage the employee to become creative, to take pride in his work, to become an efficient person, and to approach his job with a positive and aggressive attitude. Naturally an employee who works in this manner will probably be promoted and receive higher pay. But since the incentives in this group are not directly related to the employee's pay, they are considered non-financial.

They concluded that the ten broad groups of non-financial incentives listed by Robert Peterson in 1951 could be summarized in two words—"effective supervision". We would suggest instead—"good personnel administration". The ten groups Peterson cited are:

1. Weekly staff conference
2. Work (enough to do)

3. Periodic talks
4. Special privileges
5. Placement follow-through
6. Suggestion plans
7. Development of in-group spirit
8. Working conditions and equipment
9. Competition
10. Worker recognition.

Prerequisites of a Wage Incentive Plan. The Esso people found that the *development and application of a wage incentive plan was slow and expensive, required years of pre-planning, a substantial addition of personnel to the industrial relations staff, and continual maintenance and revision.* They found, too, that:

a wage incentive plan requires a sound basis of good employee relations, sound management and supervision, and a program of non-financial incentives. Wage incentive plans properly conceived, installed, administered and maintained for workers whose output is measurable have resulted in lower costs, lower selling prices, higher profits and higher wages. Most of them, however, fail to release more than a fraction of the energy and initiative workers have to give their jobs.

They concluded that certain fundamental requirements are basic to the success of any wage incentive plan. These might be considered the *keystones*, the absence or weakening of any one of which would result in the plan's eventual failure. Although these related primarily to incentives for quantity of production, there were so many similarities to the quality problem that portions of these statements have been excerpted verbatim below:

1. Measurable Employee Output or Performance

Previous discussion has referred to "measurability of work" as a factor in determining to what extent individual or group incentives should be applied. By the same token, payment by results implies the presence of some unit of measuring employee output or performance. Unless the worker is able to exercise some degree of control over his output, the incentive principle is inapplicable. In addition, plant operations should be characterized by such factors as a repetitive type of work, a constant even flow of materials, and independence of production processes. Where there is "measurability of work," a related factor is the basis of measurement.

2. Standard Work Requirements

The standard work requirement is basic for work measurement in any wage incentive plan. "No standards shall be established on an operation for incentive purposes until that operation has been subjected to a study involving the use of methods improvement techniques and the result of that study placed into effect in a satisfactory manner."

Evidence suggests that many of the faults in setting standards may be attributed to basing them on the performance of a worker

who is better than average. Sufficient care often is not devoted to rating the job rather than the worker. These errors doom a proposed wage incentive plan to almost certain failure.

3. Simplicity

A large part of the success of any wage incentive system depends on the ease with which it can be understood by the employees. Equally important is ease in calculating incentive earnings. When the plan or the pay method defies easy interpretation and explanation, the workers become suspicious and lose faith in management's sincerity of purpose

Incentive pay should be in direct proportion to increased output. Workers do not like to share with management the direct result of their greater output. Plans which involve management sharing are not readily accepted and should be avoided.

The workers want fair standards to be established first of all. Once these are exceeded they want to receive the full benefits. If the plan is on a sound and equitable basis, management should be willing to provide the worker with the full gain from his efforts, and should give him the maximum encouragement to do his best.

4. Maximum Coverage

Failure to provide the opportunity for incentive earnings to the maximum number of employees is another frequent cause of dissension and grievances. While the attitudes and abilities of a given group of workers will vary, with the result that differences may exist in the earnings among the group members each has the opportunity to participate to the extent he desires. *There may be some workers who will not wish to earn incentive pay, being content merely to receive the base rate for the job.*

5. Guaranteed Basic Wage

Workers are primarily interested in knowing, under any plan, that the base rates are guaranteed. This establishes the minimum amount that will be earned for each hour of work, and thus eliminates the uncertainty and insecurity of earnings that once accompanied most incentive plans and made the workers reluctant to accept them. Work pressure resulting from uncertainty and insecurity of earnings often reacted to impair the workers' health.

The base rate should be established by an equitable wage classification system rather than by arbitrary selection. *The base rate for any job should not be affected by whether or not the job is included in the incentive program. It is axiomatic that the base rates should reflect fair wage differentials between jobs.*

6. Adequate Grievance Machinery

Because incentives cause friction in collective bargaining, adequate grievance machinery must be provided to insure prompt and equitable treatment of all grievances that may arise once the plan has been installed. The frequency with which work standards may contribute to incentive grievances gives further emphasis to the need for adequate planning.

The importance of the supervisory personnel in this matter cannot be overemphasized. They bear a large share of the responsibility for the smooth operation of the incentive plan. For this reason, good supervisor training is a must. Also, the supervisors must be thoroughly familiar with the plan and adept at handling grievances so that the many petty gripes that arise can be handled expeditiously to prevent them from becoming major grievances. The industrial engineers can be a big help to the supervisors on these matters.

7. Management Acceptance

Many potential grievances can be automatically eliminated when management and union accept the principles and techniques of wage incentive systems. The extent of management's acceptance of the principle of payment by results governs the success or failure of any wage incentive plan. The lack of management acceptance has been responsible for many of the past failures of these plans. Management acceptance covers more than mere tacit approval of the principle of payment by results. Management must want the plan to succeed and be willing to give all possible support to insure that success

Any shortcomings of management in this connection can be expected to result in similar failures on the part of others who must share the responsibility for the success or failure of a plan; i.e., the foremen and their assistants, industrial engineers, and the hourly workers. *"The success or failure of incentives," says J. K. Loudon, "lies in the combined abilities of management, labor and industrial engineers to understand their nature, place and use."*

8. Union Acceptance

A background of good union-management relations is most helpful in securing the union's acceptance of a wage incentive plan. The historical opposition of unions to incentives due to speed-up and cost-cutting practices of management is not easily removed. *One of management's first big tasks in the development of a wage incentive plan is getting the acceptance and wholehearted cooperation of the union and the workers.* Unless they are convinced that their jobs and earnings will be protected, and that the plan will be free from many of the plaguing defects of earlier ones, the proposed plan will not be accepted readily. *Without such acceptance by the workers the plan is doomed.* Unions naturally are campaigning for a more active role in the administration of existing incentive plans.

9. Industrial Engineering Staff

The development of a sound plan and its continued functioning after installation is primarily the responsibility of the industrial engineering staff. *It is essential that the staff be of adequate size and well qualified to carry out its responsibilities in a fair and impartial manner.* This entails not only time study and methods engineers to establish, test, revise, keep up to date, and extend the work standards, but also a clerical group to post the production records for the incentive workers

10. Suggestion System

A system of financial rewards for labor or other cost-saving ideas developed by the workers is a necessary supplement for a sound

wage incentive system. Without this the workers tend to keep such ideas to themselves for the purpose of boosting their own output to earn more incentive pay. Many authorities state that the monetary reward should be at least 50 percent of the savings for the first six months. Some companies pay a reward of 50 percent of the savings during the first year the idea is used. The basic principles for the operation of effective suggestion systems must be rigidly observed to encourage worker participation and to prevent dissatisfaction with the plan.

Worker Acceptance. The Esso Study found that lack of worker interest in wage incentive systems was particularly evident in industries or areas characterized by sub-standard wage levels. On the contrary, workers in high-wage industries were more receptive to wage incentives (a situation paralleled in public education). They are anxious to realize greater incomes and are willing to admit that additional effort may be the answer. Workers on craft jobs, where the custom of paying on a unit basis has been well established, favor wage incentive systems. Payment by results is traditional with these workers.

Conclusions. The major conclusions of the Esso group are so pertinent to the problems of the schools and parallel so closely the lessons of over fifty years of experience in school administration that we have reproduced them here verbatim:

Good leadership provides the most effective incentive to increase production. Nothing has been found to take the place of good supervision and management; incentive plans are supplementary to leadership. The most effective wage incentive plan devised cannot substitute for good management, but will bring management inefficiencies to light. The supervisor is the key man in improving morale, job-satisfaction, employee attitudes and production. Therefore, all possible care should be taken to see that supervisors are adept in human relations, and are thoroughly indoctrinated in such matters as worker psychology, working with union representatives, and understanding and interpreting the union contract and company plans. If the supervisors are in fact a part of management, a climate may exist for the adoption of a formal incentive system.

Local conditions determine whether a company should adopt a specific incentive plan, and dictate the type required. Local study to discover employee needs and desires should be made before an incentive plan is chosen. No unusual plan or significant technique was discovered. Rather it was found that depending on management, union and employee attitudes, types of production operations, quality of supervision, levels of existing wage rates, and many other factors, different plants might require either non-financial incentives or one of the many financial incentive plans. Many authorities suggest a mixture of both, with emphasis dependent on the local situation.

Non-financial incentives seem to be the most effective type for a normal situation. That is, in a normal economy where workers receive reasonable wages and enjoy a measure of security, non-financial incentives have been the most successful. Non-financial incentives (such as use of praise, recognition, plenty of work, good working conditions) have proved valuable in increasing the employee's desire to work and improving his attitude

toward his job. A man's time, his presence on the job, a measured quantity of work may be bought. *Job satisfaction, enthusiasm and pride in work, impossible to buy, can be developed only by an enlightened management constantly striving to find methods for creating teamwork.* Measurement of success in money alone will not insure favorable employee attitudes. Most men are motivated by more than the dollar sign. Being on the right job, having a good working spot, and receiving recognition for work well done, are all important non-financial incentives. The supervisor's role in the function of non-financial incentives is obvious.

Financial incentives, other than direct wage incentives, are essential to good employee relations but are comparatively weak as incentives to increase production. Indirect financial incentives (such as a fair wage classification system, a sound promotional procedure, and fringe benefits) may be said to improve employee output negatively; that is, where they do not exist, morale and productivity suffer. Direct financial incentives other than wage plans (bonuses of various kinds, profit-sharing and stock-ownership plans, and executive incentive plans) usually improve employee relations generally, but are questioned as far as the incentive principle is concerned because the reward is remote from individual performance. It has been shown that these direct financial incentives are influenced by the state of the over-all economy and other factors beyond the worker's control. Moreover, in a large company any individual contribution through increased productivity is too insignificant to influence the ultimate "take". This may not apply to executive incentive compensation. Many feel that executive incentive plans have improved management. No criticism is directed at these plans as part of the employee relations program, but rather at the fallacy of looking to them as incentives to individual performance. There is little evidence that financial incentives (other than specific wage incentive plans) have succeeded in increasing the worker's desire to produce more.

Wage incentive plans are more suitable for use in other industries than petroleum refining, but include valuable incentive procedures which may be used independently. Because wage incentive plans base the worker's pay directly on his output, some yardstick must be available for measuring output and relating quality to earnings. Furthermore, the worker must be able to exert a measure of control over his performance, which presupposes a constant even flow of materials, independence of production processes and a more or less repetitive type of work. For these reasons, wage incentive plans have not proved practical in the process industries.

Wage incentive plans provide significant techniques for measuring employee performance, e.g. (1) job performance standards and merit rating to document ability for use in promotion; and (2) job evaluation to correct classification inequities. The application of work standards *without the incentive feature* is reported to be gaining popularity in industry.

These conclusions emphasize the value of non-financial incentives. This in effect tends to de-emphasize the potentialities of wage incentive plans. However, a great deal of research still can be devoted to extending the use of various incentives in industry.

Increasing the employee's incentive to work is a human relations problem as well as a technical one. James F. Lincoln claims it is philosophy rather than a technique. Whether a specific financial plan is adopted or non-financial incentives are relied upon, the importance of enlightened leadership from top management through first line supervisors cannot be over-emphasized.

Basic Considerations From Other Sources

In 1946 it was noted that "it is not nearly so hard to establish an incentive plan as it is to administer it properly. Unless management is prepared to expend the necessary effort, adopting a plan is useless."

In 1948 it was said that "the success or failure of any program of incentives, whether direct or indirect, financial or non-financial, depends upon the basic soundness of its principles and on the philosophy behind it, rather than on any particular formula."

Solomon Barkin in an article on "Labor's Attitude Toward Wage Incentive Plans" referred to a *wage incentive system* as "*the last trick in a program of cost reduction,*" adding that "workers are skeptical when it becomes the first one." He noted that in order to be acceptable to trade unions, incentive programs "*must be tailored and administered in a manner which will strengthen rather than weaken the feeling of group security—where wage incentive programs are cooperatively developed and administered the opportunity for successful reconciliation of views and pressures is greatly increased.*"

The late Philip Murray pointed out that *where morale is high and a good understanding exists between management and union members, almost any wage system can be made to work.*

It is only fair to note that: "A basic though rarely mentioned reason for organized labor's traditional antagonism to wage incentives is that the more directly the worker controls the amount of compensation he receives, the less need he is likely to feel for union assistance in securing higher wages, although when base rates are raised or lowered, his rates are equally affected."

James F. Lincoln in 1951 listed three important reasons why incentive plans fail:

1. Lack of understanding on the part of management of the human urges involved.
2. Lack of honesty of purpose on the part of management.
3. Lack of ability on the part of management to make the team and do its part to the extent that the worker accepts management as a teammate.

Lincoln contended further that the industrial manager who wishes to adopt an incentive program "must first answer these questions:

- I. Can he show those in positions under him that he deserves to lead them?
- II. Can management respect and recognize the skill of the worker in proportion to the development in productive ability that he has made?
- III. Can management justify its salary compared with the salary of all others in the organization? Does the worker think so?
- IV. Can and will management put itself under development pressure that will increase its own ability and skill and make it progress and become outstanding?
- V. Can management put the worker under incentive pressure that will stimulate him to develop himself? Can management really lead?
- VI. Can management control the stockholder so he won't take for himself much of the savings made by the efficiency of the whole organization under incentive management, which savings largely belong to the consumer and the workers, including management, who did the job?
- VII. Will management advance men from within and only on their ability?
- VIII. Can management continue to lead honestly and ably after some measure of success has been achieved, or will it go soft?
- IX. Is management sure it wants to be a member of the team, instead of being a boss of the old school who depends on fear to make his leadership unquestioned?

Incentive management is a challenge to every ounce of ability that management has."

SUPPLEMENTARY MEMORANDUM 2

A CASE STUDY IN MERIT PAY SCALES — THE CITY OF ROCHESTER¹

Rochester has been chosen as a case study of the effects of teacher salary legislation on a school system because the teachers, board of education, and administration believed that the plan should be given a fair trial. The teachers, through their salary negotiating committee, recommended to the board of education complete cooperation in the effort to apply the State mandate relating to promotional and merit differentials.

The Rochester experience is thought to be especially significant because more than 1,000 teachers have been evaluated and more than 300 promoted under its merit system. This undoubtedly gives the largest volume of experience with merit promotion. Furthermore, it was not possible financially to carry all teachers to the top merit levels on the State Schedule! Then, too, if differentials among various training groups were to be maintained, something less than a fully automatic schedule was for practical reasons a necessity for Rochester.

Characteristics of the Rochester Schedule

Prior to 1948, differentials for training, for those with two, three, four and five years of training, had been set up. These differentials had also extended to mid-points, e.g., a differential of \$50 was granted for 15 semester hours beyond the bachelor's degree. The differential for the master's degree was \$400.

Since 1943 progress had been made in the direction of a Single Salary Schedule, though this had not yet been fully achieved when the Salary Law of 1947 was enacted. Also, some high school teachers had a salary advantage as a carry-over from an earlier merit system limited to the high schools and abandoned at the onset of the depression for lack of funds. While the direct reason was lack of funds, it must be recorded that the system had bottlenecked and both teachers and administrators felt relieved when it was given up. It also must be noted that this old merit system was fairer in that all teachers from the first year on were eligible for consideration and simpler in that it was administered on a building basis. Like the system of 1947, however, and probably any merit system, it ran afoul of percentage limitations dictated by budget considerations.

¹Excerpt from *Teacher Competence and Its Relation to Salary*, New England School Development Council, Cambridge, Massachusetts, July, 1956.

Statewide Increases Mandated in 1947

An emergency \$300 Cost-of-Living increment financed by the State was passed on to all teachers in Rochester, although localities were allowed to subtract the amounts of recent local raises. This across-the-board adjustment preserved the training differentials which existed before the State adjustment.

The State mandate of 1947, requiring that teachers' salaries be increased by \$600 over the salary of 1945, was carried through, but in each case the amount of any increase from 1945 to 1947 was subtracted because there was not money available to do more. Rochester is on a fiscal year which coincides with the calendar year, and could not get additional funds at this time. The effect was to cancel out earned additional training credits and service increments, and thus to nullify the principles on which the local salary schedule had been built.

The Teachers' Salary Law of 1947, incorporating the merit provisions, was made, upon the recommendation of the Rochester Salary Negotiating Committee, the basis for a new salary schedule, worked out during the school year 1947-48 and enacted in June 1948.

The Schedule of 1948

Instead of the minimum State mandate of six steps, this schedule provided for twelve automatic steps for those with three or more years of training; for nine automatic steps for those with only two years. The minimum State mandates were applied to teachers with only two years of training, and differentials added for each further year of training. It provided a differential of \$300 for the Master's degree instead of the mandated \$200 or the previously existing one of \$400. A sixth year of training was also recognized.

The new schedule provided for those with more than two years of training higher levels than the State mandated as a minimum at each of the sixteen steps. These varied from \$200 to \$350. Rochester felt that because of its high standards of performance, as well as its high cost of living, it was necessary to maintain its lead over the similar areas of the State, and to a greater degree than the new State minimums mandated.

Rochester undertook in this schedule to apply the same minimum percentages in the merit brackets as would apply at the lower salary levels of the minimum State schedule.

The Application of the Merit Provisions

The Advisory Committee was set up as required by law, and the democratic principle further extended by having most of the administrative membership on the committee elected by the teachers. This committee

recommended a Set of Standards of Excellence on which teachers might be evaluated. These were approved by the board of education.

Of the number eligible in June 1948, at Step 12, for promotion, 227 were in the high school and none were from the elementary school. Of these, about two-thirds had the advantage in their step placement because of the fact that the local schedule had contained a \$400 instead of a \$200 differential for the master's degree. Some of the other third had the advantage of their classification under the old and abandoned merit system.

Under the regulations, three-quarters of these must be promoted. The actual number of promotions from Step 12 to Step 13 was 187.

Though only ten high schools were involved in this first round, it was necessary to adopt some method of reducing the error due to the inescapable unevenness of the raters. The standard scores procedure was used.

There was considerable perturbation among teachers, though quite manifestly less than there would have been had a smaller percentage been selected. There was no marked criticism from elementary teachers because it was recognized that under the law, step assignment was mechanical, and locally there was no choice but to promote three-quarters of those eligible. The situation was also eased because all teachers were on their way to full implementation at the top of the automatic level and their positive salary gains were relatively high.

As there were no teachers at Step 11 in 1947, those who had been left at Step 12 (still all high school people) were the only ones eligible for promotion at this level in 1948-49. Forty-two of the fifty-six were advanced. This meant that of those who had been eligible for promotion in September 1948, more than 93½ percent had now been advanced—under the Regulation that 75 percent must be promoted every year until the quotas of 10 percent in the topmost merit promotion bracket and 20 percent in the two top merit brackets had been moved up. It seemed obvious to many that at least several of those selected could not really be called "superior teachers" and that in this respect the law was self-defeating. It began to be apparent that with the minimum percentage quotas now almost filled, there might be a real outcry the succeeding year.

Table II

Number of Teachers Promoted

Year	Step 16	Step 15	Step 13	Step 10	Total
1948	50	3	187	5	245
1949	3		42		45
1950			37	1	38
Total	53	3	266	6	328

Table III

Placement of Rochester Teachers on Salary Schedule

Step	1	2	3	4	5
	1947-48 State	1949-50 State	1949-50 Local	1950-51 State	1950-51 Local
1	74	1	55		47
2	25	43	43	38	45
3	34	43	50	41	51
4	14	40	30	33	46
5	18	14	13	26	34
6	245	29	15	30	16
7	217	11	12	33	17
8	168	14	12	17	10
9	332	209	215	198	199
10			8		11
11			12		8
12	284	251	679	229	640
13		439 }	40	434 }	37
14			185		38
15					177
16		321	48	335	46
Total	1411	1415	1417	1414	1422

Column 1 gives original placement in 1947-48.

Steps are omitted for 1948-49 because of transition from State to local steps with 40 percent implementation of the local schedule through Step 12. In the transition year the step was a moving point.

Columns 2 and 3 show State and local steps for 1949-50.

Columns 4 and 5 show State and local steps for 1950-51.

It must be remembered that the Rochester schedule is never less than \$200 above the State minimum and at one point is \$350 beyond it.

These figures will not be accurate all along the line with other tabulations, because: first, after the evaluations of 1948, Albany ruled that department heads should be stepped on combined salary, including differential for added responsibility; and second, number of eligibles shifted as teachers retired or were added. The "combined salary" ruling did violence to what seemed a perfectly fair local practice, that of proportioning the differential to size of department and length of service as department head.

In September 1949, for action in June 1950, the board needed to fill only nine places in the promotional brackets in order to satisfy its own requirements. There was money only to do this—and perhaps to go just a little beyond. There were now, because of full implementation, 679 teachers at Step 12, of whom 349 were from the elementary division. This was their first chance at merit promotion. The candidates were drawn from 55 different

schools. Some of them had split schedules, carrying them into three and four schools. It was in effect necessary to compare a kindergarten teacher with a high school teacher of French, a school librarian with a machine shop teacher, etcetera, etcetera. It was more than ever necessary to use the standard scores procedure with all its obvious limitations. Less than one teacher per school could, with the funds available, be promoted. Many far superior to those promoted in the previous two years had to be passed by.

The standard scores procedure became known as a "mysterious formula," though not using it would have resulted in greater injustice.

The board actually promoted 34 teachers instead of the minimum of nine. It did this in order to make sure that there was a distinct (though unfortunately not too great) difference between the last teacher promoted and the first of those not accepted; also to insure some reasonable distribution as between elementary and secondary schools. Of the 34 finally selected, 22 were elementary teachers.

It was not possible for the two general supervisors available to visit and properly to evaluate the more than 300 eligibles among the elementary teachers. As the supervisors' score was averaged with that of the building principal, only those elementary teachers were visited by general supervisors who had a chance of final selection after the averaging was done. Even though this was fair, many thought it was not psychologically sound.

Strenuous effort had been made to recruit more elementary supervisors. The fact that evaluating had to become part of the job, made it practically impossible to get anyone. There were four refusals from among Rochester's own staff, and one resignation.

Aside from the effects on teachers, there were adverse effects on administrators and supervisors.

A great deal of paper work was necessary, for the records must be reviewable by the individual teacher, and on appeal by the Commissioner and/or the courts. This necessitated some kind of anecdotal record. In most instances these were meticulously done, but the necessity of writing highly judicious English under time pressures was a great strain on those who had to do it.

Much time and energy was diverted from on-going programs which might have been of much more real benefit to instruction. Principals and supervisors became aware of a new and unfortunate attitude toward supervision.

Teachers and board are now faced with this problem: if no new funds become available to permit a larger number of promotions (or, better, to increase the number of automatic steps) action in June 1951 must be limited to some 94 of 197 teachers at Step 15. These are a part of the same high school teachers moved to Step 13 in June 1948 under the 75 percent

rule. To take them to Step 16 and promote no more from Step 12, will meet the obligation of the board, but it will increase the gap between them and many other as worthy teachers and so increase the general tension.

In an effort to assess teacher feeling with regard to their salary plan and management, representatives of the administration of the system made a survey of teachers in the system. They asked: (1) what are the benefits of the Merit Program as it has been operated in Rochester these last three years? (2) what are the limitations of the Merit Program as applied in Rochester these last three years? (3) what suggestions do teachers have for the improvement of the Merit Program?

It is quite evident from the responses that Rochester did not have a happy experience with its interpretation of the 1947 Teachers' Salary Law. Limited in its conception of its ability to support teachers' salaries, having an older teaching staff, only started on the elimination of a positional-type differential, Rochester was in no position to institute all of the reforms of the 1947 Salary Law immediately. Its position of being \$200 higher than the State-mandated minimum B-Schedule did not require that Rochester do so. Yet Rochester elected to do so.

James M. Spinning, former Superintendent of Schools in Rochester, summed up the Rochester experiment partly as follows:

Teachers tended to withhold their applause of the merit plan because:

1. The legislation was "jammed through".
2. No unimpeachable scientific case had been established for teacher evaluation.
3. Eligibility for consideration was arbitrarily and mechanically determined.
4. The proportion of promotions was itself a mechanical factor.
5. The permissive and liberalizing features of the law were easily nullified by lack of funds.
6. Wealthier communities could buy their way out of merit evaluation. "Only the poor were forced to be pure."
7. Promotion once granted could not be recalled.
8. There was almost nowhere to look for successful experience.
9. Administrators and supervisors had not adequate time for preparation.
10. Constructive leadership was endangered.
11. Teachers knew the limitations of objective criteria.
12. They saw cooperation giving way to competition.
13. They could not accept the college concept of academic rank as valid for elementary and secondary schools.
14. They foresaw administrative dilemmas in the problems of jurisdiction, transfer, and bottlenecking.

Mr. Spinning then proceeded to outline some of the advantages brought about by the 1947 law:

1. New York State teachers did get higher salary schedules.
2. The principle of the single salary schedule was affirmed.
3. Teachers and school administrators were stimulated to reappraise teaching values. "Teacher evaluation, especially self-evaluation, is always a good thing—if it is not so geared to something else as to defeat its purpose—the improvement of teaching."
4. Some teachers were roused out of lethargy.

Spinning emphasized that Rochester faced the issue squarely and, in spite of misgivings, devoted time and effort to a diligent application of the principles outlined in the 1947 law. But the fundamentals were unanswered:

1. "Can the contribution of each teacher fairly be appraised?"
2. "Can a system of financial rewards based on such appraisals be wisely and fairly administered?"

SUPPLEMENTARY MEMORANDUM 3

MERIT RATING SCALES

SCHOOL DISTRICT No. 2, CRANBROOK

ADDENDUM FOR SECONDARY SCHOOL ONLY, BEING PROPOSED FORMULA FOR ARRIVING AT A DECISION PERTAINING TO CLAUSES 6, 7, AND 8

1. Carrying a fair share of co-curricular activities—It is understood that this varies and is dependent on factors of load involved in the teaching of various courses. Consideration shall be given only to participation in those activities directly connected with the school. It is of prime importance that initiative shown and intellectual stimulus provided be assessed in this category, which covers such things as sponsorship and supervision of student councils, year book, library club, school paper, teams, band, dances, clubs, etcetera.

Points Allowed 20.

2. Attention to matters which keep the school functioning smoothly:
 - (a) Classroom supervision—not only of class in session but proper supervision of halls, assemblies, lunchroom, detention hall, examinations, vicinity of school, etcetera.
 - (b) Complete conformity to application of school regulations—where a situation not covered by school regulations develops a teacher is expected to adopt and use a policy of common sense.
 - (c) Promptness and care in turning in sundry reports, mark sheets, textbook issue, etcetera.
 - (d) Punctuality and consideration—Consideration of other teachers, administration, office staff, custodians, etcetera.
 - (e) Willingness to perform teaching duties beyond normal load—Consideration to be given to teachers handling courses for which they have little or no specific training.

Points allowed 30.

3. Teacher - Pupil relationships:
 - (a) Professionalism—dignity; never aloof nor familiar.
 - (b) Knowledge of subject matter.
 - (c) Ability to analyze and solve disciplinary problems.
 - (d) Posture and presence in classroom.

- (e) Use of proper English. Avoidance of slang, sarcasm and abusive terms.

Points allowed 30.

- 4. Teaching ability and efficiency as evaluated by inspections of Principal and Inspector.

Points allowed 120.

This gives a possible of 200 points which can be divided by 2 to give a percentage evaluation. It is felt that only a teacher achieving a final score of 80% be eligible for any payment above basic scale.

Terms of Agreement in Connection With Proposed Formula

1. There shall be instituted by the Cranbrook Teachers' Association a Liaison Committee consisting of 10% of the membership of the Cranbrook Teachers' Association to meet with the Education Committee of the Board of School Trustees once a month for the purpose of discussing education.
2. A system of paid Department Heads shall be instituted in September 1958.
3. There shall be a minimum of four (4) inspections per year by the Principal plus the inspection by the Department of Education Inspector, plus inspections by Department Heads. The result of these inspections shall be presented with recommendations to a Committee consisting of (1) Education Committee of the Board of School Trustees, (2) Principal, (3) Inspector. It shall then be the duty of this Committee to recommend to the Cranbrook School Board of Trustees names of those to be considered for salary increases.
4. The Board of School Trustees shall not consider for extra increments or other emoluments anyone not recommended by the Committee as stated in paragraph 3 above.
5. Notice of increments to be granted or withheld shall be given in writing by Secretary-Treasurer of School District No. 2 (Cranbrook) not later than May 31st.
6. There shall be a Board of Appeal instituted consisting of the Education Committee of the Board, the Principal, the Inspector and the entire Liaison Committee. Application to this Board shall be made through the Chairman of the Liaison Committee.

It is understood by both of Board of School Trustees and the Cranbrook Teachers' Association that this is an experiment. In all probability revisions will have to be made and values in certain categories reassessed. The success or failure of this experiment depends mainly on complete cooperation of all concerned.

NISKAYUNA CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT
STORY AVENUE
SCHENECTADY 9, NEW YORK

Evaluation Check List

I. Effectiveness In The Classroom

1. The teacher has a knowledge of subject matter of grade level and/or field of specialization. ☐
2. Teacher maintains a classroom of controlled freedom which is democratic and cooperative with respect for adult authority. ☐
3. The teacher has long range plans for his group which indicate a grasp of the objectives of his grade with sufficient flexibility to be adaptable to the needs and interests of his group. ☐
4. The teacher demonstrates effective instructional procedures. ☐
5. The teacher creates a happy situation so that pupils express a liking for class. ☐
6. The teacher recognizes contributions and efforts of individual pupils. ☐
7. The teacher provides for social, emotional, physical, moral as well as academic growth. The teacher has a well-balanced program consistent with subject matter or grade level, directed toward the development of the whole child. ☐
8. The teacher uses aids and resources to supplement regular teaching methods. ☐
9. The teacher adjusts the physical features of the room to provide a healthful and attractive environment as far as circumstances permit. ☐
10. The teacher is fair and impartial. ☐
11. The teacher shows evidence of resourcefulness, creativeness, and individuality. ☐

II. Effectiveness In Parent-Teacher Relations

1. The teacher has sympathetic and understanding attitude towards parents. ☐
2. The teacher displays diplomacy and tact in dealing with parents. ☐
3. The teacher inspires confidence in parents and assures them of a real interest in the welfare of their children. ☐
4. The teacher uses sufficient time and preparation to make parent reporting useful and satisfying to both parent and teacher ☐

III. Effectiveness In Staff Relations

1. The teacher maintains ethical school relationships. ☐
2. The teacher is a "sharing" person. ☐
3. The teacher is a cooperative and understanding person. ☐

IV. Effectiveness With The Profession

1. The teacher maintains an active interest in the profession. ☐
2. The teacher has a positive attitude toward the profession. ☐

Evaluation Procedures and Application to Salary

The evaluation of the teaching job will be done in terms of the following code:

4—Greatly above standard

3—Above standard

2—Standard

1—Below standard

x—No basis for evaluation

Evaluators may also use the scores of 1.5, 2.5, 3.5. In addition to this it should be understood that each of the four teaching areas will be weighted as follows:

Area I - - - 6

Area II - - - 2

Area III - - - 2

Area IV - - - 1

In addition to having an average rating within the evaluated ranges set forth below, a teacher must have a minimum rating of 2.0 in the Areas I, II, III to be eligible for a merit increment.

A teacher may receive a salary increment at one evaluation range only four times. Thereafter, there will be no additional salary increment until the rating is within a higher range. The following chart shows the amount of increment and the salary limitations for each score.

Evaluation Score	Amount of Increment	Salary Limitations		
		AB	AB+30	AB+60
3.8 - 4.00	\$600.	\$8600.	\$8900.	\$9200.
3.4 - 3.79	\$500.	\$8300.	\$8600.	\$8900.
3.0 - 3.39	\$400.	\$7900.	\$8200.	\$8500.
2.6 - 2.99	\$300.	\$7500.	\$7800.	\$8100.
2.2 - 2.59	\$200.	\$7100.	\$7400.	\$7700.

Evaluation Score Sheet

Teacher _____ Date _____ Evaluation _____

Scoring Procedures

Area I

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

Rating

Total for Area I

Divided by # of observed criteria

Score for Area I

Area II

1.

2.

3.

4.

Rating

Total for Area II

Divided by # of observed criteria

Score for Area II

Area III

1.

2.

3.

Rating

Total for Area III

Divided by # of observed criteria

Score for Area III

Area IV

1.

2.

Rating

Total for Area IV

Divided by # of observed criteria

Score for Area IV

	Score	Weight		Weighted Score
Area I	_____	× 6	=	_____
Area II	_____	× 2	=	_____
Area III	_____	× 2	=	_____
Area IV	_____	× 1	=	_____
Sum of weighted scores ÷ 11 =				_____ FINAL SCORE

¹All criteria in Area I to be evaluated.

ITHACA PUBLIC SCHOOLS

Ithaca, New York

Evaluation and Measure of the Total Service of the Teacher

TEACHER _____ SCHOOL _____

DEPARTMENT/SUBJECT _____
OR GRADE _____ CONFERENCE DATE _____

SIGNATURE OF: 1. TEACHER _____

2. EVALUATOR _____ 3. EVALUATOR _____

DESCRIPTION OF CRITERIA FOR EACH LEVEL OF ACHIEVEMENT

A five-point rating scale will be used in evaluating teaching services.

A rating of "1" in areas I, II, and III shall be necessary in order for promotion to the eleventh and twelfth level of the salary schedule. Areas IV and V shall be used for additional information in arriving at the total evaluation of the teacher.

DIRECT SERVICE TO PUPILS

- I. Teaching Ability
- II. Classroom Management
- III. Contribution to the Total School Program

TEACHER QUALITIES AND GROWTH

- IV. Personal Qualities
- V. Professional Growth

Teachers rating "1" may be defined as those who possess the following characteristics:

- A. A strong and pleasant personality
- B. A genuine respect for the profession and the members thereof
- C. Good health
- D. An ethical point of view
- E. An understanding of human nature and individual differences
- F. Have excellent command of the subject matter in their field both in range and depth
- G. Have ability to instruct clearly, to manage classroom efficiently, and to control easily without undue dominance
- H. Have a genuine interest in boys and girls, a knowledge of the physical and emotional characteristics of age group, and a desire to provide a happy, meaningful classroom environment for learning experiences appropriate to the age level.

I. Have ability to evaluate and utilize discriminately current professional theories and practices

J. Have ability to plan a diversified program which provides for maximum enrichment of learning experiences through the use of all available and appropriate teaching materials, (audio-visual materials, natural and community resources, field trips, libraries, etc.) and provides for a variety of media for expression of ideas: dramatization, creative writing, folk songs, poetry and literature

K. Have ability to take initiative and to help plan and to carry out school programs within their own school and for the school system

L. Willingly cooperate in aiding and enriching the teaching experience of other teachers

M. Contribute to the growth of the profession through writing, speaking, and committee membership when afforded the opportunity

N. Accept the responsibility for their own professional growth through advanced study, professional reading, and affiliation with in-service groups.

A rating of "2" in areas I, II, and III shall be necessary in order for promotion to the ninth and tenth level of the salary schedule. Areas IV and V shall be used for additional information in arriving at the total evaluation of the teacher.

Teachers rating "2" must possess, at least, the first eight characteristics outlined for a "1" rating: A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H.

A rating of "3" in all areas shall be necessary for promotion to the continuous service staff.

A "4" rating indicates that the teacher does not possess the characteristics listed for rating "1" or "2" in a sufficiently high degree necessary for successful teaching. A teacher who cannot rise above this rating, will not be promoted to the continuous service staff.

A "5" rating indicates that a serious question is raised concerning the teacher's work and that he should not be recommended for reappointment.

It is not expected that all sub-items under each major area shall be checked, but all applicable items should be marked.

DIRECT SERVICE TO PUPILS

I. TEACHING ABILITY	5	4	3	2	1
A. Evaluation of subject matter and functional application					
B. Knowledge of subject matter					
C. Organization of the work					
D. Definiteness and clearness of aim					
E. Preparation of lessons					
F. Presentation of work					
G. Effectiveness in pupil participation					
H. Effective use of questions					
I. Knowledge, use, and interpretation of tests and testing techniques					
J. Skill in making assignments					
K. Skill in development of study habits					
L. Skill in awakening interest and effort					
M. Attention to individual abilities and needs					
N. Aptness in using references and illustrative materials					
O. Development of critical thinking					
P. Development of habits, attitudes and appreciations					
Q. Provision for opportunities to develop self-discipline					
R. Voice and speech					
Evaluation—Teaching Ability	5	4	3	2	1
II. CLASSROOM MANAGEMENT	5	4	3	2	1
A. Physical well-being of pupils					
B. Emotional well-being of pupils					
C. Teacher-pupil rapport					
D. Organization of routine					
E. Appearance of the classroom					
F. Evidence of worthwhile activities					
G. Care of school materials					
H. Effective use of school materials					
I. Social control					
Evaluation—Classroom Management	5	4	3	2	1

III. CONTRIBUTION OF THE TEACHER TO THE TOTAL SCHOOL PROGRAM	5	4	3	2	1
A. Participation in faculty meetings					
B. Faculty committees					
C. Assembly and other programs					
D. Playground					
E. Noon hour, bus duty, etc.					
F. Evening meetings and P. T. A.					
G. Cooperation with cadet program					
H. Outside help to students and teachers					
I. Club programs and intramural sports					
J. Homerooms					
K. Student organizations					
L. Excursions, field trips					
M. Observations by other teachers					
N. Promptness and accuracy with reports					
Evaluation—Contribution of the Teacher to the Total School Program	5	4	3	2	1

TEACHER QUALITIES AND GROWTH

IV. PERSONAL QUALITIES OF THE TEACHER	5	4	3	2	1
A. Professional attitude					
1. Ethical conduct					
2. Respect for the teaching profession					
3. Acceptance and use of suggestions					
B. Traits of character					
1. Cheerfulness					
2. Loyalty					
3. Sense of humor					
4. Sincerity					
5. Courage					
6. Tact					
7. Judgment: fairness and sense of proportion					
8. Sympathy and understanding					
9. Responsibility					
10. Resourcefulness					
C. Personal appearance					
Evaluation—Personal Qualities of the Teacher	5	4	3	2	1

V. PROFESSIONAL GROWTH OF THE TEACHER

COMMENTS

A. Education

1. Initial training

2. In-service training

3. Attendance at conferences and workshops

B. Cooperation with educational research projects

C. Professional leadership

D. Community service

E. Professional reading

F. Travel

G. Work experience

H. Membership in professional organizations

I. Other

Evaluation—Professional Growth of the Teacher

5	4	3	2	1

TOTAL EVALUATION OF THE TOTAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE TEACHER

Check the appropriate rating

5	4	3	2	1

Comments:



136141

Alberta Teachers' Association

Merit rating and tenure

LB
2844
C3A4

136141

LB
2844
C3A4

Alberta Teachers' Association
Merit rating and tenure

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